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Abstract. This articles assesses the arguments that bioethicists have presented for the view that patients’
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Introduction
Autonomy is a central value in Western medicine
and medical ethics, but exactly what kind of role
medicine ought to give to patients’ autonomy
seems to be somewhat obscure. It is plausible that
autonomous persons are often in the best position
to determine what would be good and bad for
them (see, e.g., Sumner (1996)) and, consequently,
it is arguable that there is good reason to consider
patients’ autonomy to have instrumental value in
medicine. But in addition to giving patients’
autonomy instrumental value, some bioethicists
maintain that autonomy is so important that there
are cases where patients should be allowed to
make their own choices about their treatment even
if it is clear for all parties involved that others
would be in a better position to make choices that
would serve the patients’ wellbeing (see
Glover, 1977, pp. 80–81; Buchanan and Brock,
1990, pp. 38–39; Beauchamp and Childress,
2001, pp. 176–187;
1 Gillon, 2003, p. 310;
Harris, 2003, p. 11). Some of these philosophers
maintain that patients’ autonomy can be restricted
if there is a threat of very severe harm to patients
wellbeing,
2 but others seem to accept no limits to
patients’ autonomy when there is no danger of
harming others.
3 In this article, I will assess the
reasons bioethicists have presented to support the
view that the value of patients’ autonomy is not
exhausted by its instrumental value in promoting
patients’ wellbeing.
The notion of autonomy
Although the notion of autonomy has been used in
many distinct senses in different connections, in
biomedical ethics there is a common core under-
standing of the meaning of this notion. According
to this idea, autonomy means self-government. Of
course, what exactly this means is controversial.
The proponents of the view that patients’ auton-
omy has value over and beyond its instrumental
value in enhancing patients’ wellbeing mentioned
above accept a procedural conception of individual
autonomy (see Glover, 1977; Buchanan and Brock,
1990; Beauchamp and Childress, 2001; Gillon,
2003; Harris, 2003). Beauchamp and Childress
(2001, p. 58), for example, write as follows:
Personal autonomy is, at minimum, self-rule that
is free from both controlling interference by oth-
ers and from limitations, such as inadequate
understanding, that prevent meaningful choice.
The autonomous individual acts freely in accor-
dance with a self-chosen plan, analogous to the
way an independent government manages its terri-
tories and sets its policies. A person of diminished
autonomy, by contrast, is in some respect con-
trolled by others or incapable of deliberating or
acting on the basis of his or her desires and plans.
For example, prisoners and mentally retarded
individuals often have diminished autonomy.
According to this kind of conception, a per-
son’s beliefs, desires, choices, decisions, etc. are
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criteria. As the above quotation suggests, there can
be different views about exactly how these criteria
should be formulated. I would however argue that
all plausible procedural theories of individual
autonomy accept at least the following require-
ments. If a person’s behavior results from such
things as compulsion and weakness of will, then it
is not autonomous but heteronomous. If a person’s
choices, decisions, beliefs, desires, etc. are due to
such external inﬂuences as unreﬂected socializa-
tion, manipulation, coercion, etc., they are not
autonomous. And if a person’s beliefs concerning
some matter are false, inconsistent with each other,
or she is uninformed about that matter without her
realizing this, then she is not autonomous with
respect that matter. According to this kind of
conception of individual autonomy, an autono-
mous person may thus have false beliefs and beliefs
that are inconsistent with each other and she may
be uninformed about some matter as long as she
realizes it; in her self-regarding matters an auton-
omous person may choose not to know certain
things, she may want to take risks, or she may
consider a decision she is to make too inconse-
quential for information gathering.
In addition to those mentioned above, a further
characteristic of individual autonomy relevant to
the following discussion is that autonomy admits
of degrees. There is thus a continuum of auton-
omy, and different individuals at different phases
and with respect to different circumstances of their
lives occupy different locations on that continuum.
It is usually accepted that persons need not be
ideally autonomous in order to qualify as auton-
omous agents. Instead, it is taken that, for practical
purposes it is possible to determine thresholds, and
that those whose autonomy exceeds the relevant
threshold qualify as autonomous persons.
4
The procedural conception of autonomy con-
trasts with theories of autonomy which maintain
that an autonomous person will always act on the
basis of certain motives and/or will accept certain
substantive views.
5 Kantian conceptions of auton-
omy, for example, usually
6 hold that in their
decisions and actions autonomous persons do not
give weight to the particular desires and wishes that
they have. Instead, autonomous persons are indi-
viduals whose actions are determined by impartial
and abstract principles of reason. Concerning the
case of a suﬀering patient who requests for
euthanasia to end her distress, for example, Kan-
tian conceptions of autonomy would imply that
there is no morally compelling reason to accede to
the patient’s wish as it is based on her personal
attitudes towards pain and death, not on a maxim
that is universalizable in the Kantian sense. The
most important diﬀerence between these kinds of
conceptions of autonomy and the procedural
theories of autonomy is that, as such, the latter
do not determine answers to such questions as
whether or not voluntary euthanasia is morally
permissible, but allow for diﬀerent possibilities. If,
for example, the patient’s wish to die fulﬁls the
criteria that a procedural theory of autonomy
presents for autonomous desires and wishes, and
other things are being equal, then the theory
implies that the wish should be obeyed. It is not
possible to go into to the pros and cons of diﬀerent
kinds of conception of the nature of autonomy
here.
7 As the procedural conception of autonomy
is commonly accepted in medical ethics,
8 below I
will concentrate on the value of autonomy per-
ceived in that way.
The notion of intrinsic value
Below I will refer to the view that the value of
patients’ autonomy is not exhausted by its instru-
mental value in promoting their wellbeing as the
view that patients’ autonomy has intrinsic value. In
philosophical literature, the notion of intrinsic
value has been used in different senses, and
philosophers disagree over what, if anything, has
intrinsic value, and over whether or not there can
be a coherent concept of intrinsic value at all (see,
e.g., Zimmerman, 2001). To use the expressions
commonly used in characterizing intrinsic value,
the intrinsic value of autonomy can be described as
the value that autonomy has in itself or for its own
sake, as opposed to its being valuable for the sake
of something else. The distinction between some-
thing’s being valuable for its own sake and
something’s being valuable for the sake of some
other thing is perhaps easiest to grasp by way of
illustration. Consider the case where A asks B
whether it is good that a physician treats B’s
broken leg and B answers, ‘‘Yes, of course it is.’’ A
then goes on to ask why the physician’s acting in
this way is good, and B replies that it is good
because it is good for her that both of her legs work
properly. A continues by inquiring why it is good
for B that both of her legs work normally, and B
replies that it is good for her because otherwise she
could not go on with her life in the way that she
wants. Then A wants to now why is it good for B
to be able to continue living her life in the way that
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for her because it brings her pleasure. But then A
wants to know what is good about pleasure. At
that point B could just state that pleasure is good,
or she could try to present reasons for why pleasure
is good. In any case, at some point B would have to
put an end to the questions, because she would
recognize that if one thing derives its goodness
from some other thing, which in its turn derives its
goodness from yet a third thing, and so on, there
would come a point at which B reaches something
whose goodness is not derivative in this way,
something that just is good for its own sake, or
intrinsically good. Those who maintain that there
ultimately is nothing of intrinsic value or that the
notion of intrinsic value itself is incoherent could of
course argue that such a point never comes.
Instead of going into this controversy, I will for
the sake of argument assume that there comes a
point at which the goodness of a thing is not
derived from the goodness of some other thing and
that autonomy is at least a plausible candidate for
a thing having this kind of value.
9 With this
understanding of the view that autonomy’s value
for patients is not exhausted by its instrumental
value in promoting their wellbeing, I turn to
assessing the arguments that bioethicists have
presented to support this view. A problem with
assessing the arguments for the view that patients’
autonomy has intrinsic value is that it is often hard
to say exactly what these arguments are. The
proponents of this view usually present only some
brief remarks to support it; they do not provide
detailed characterizations of exactly how they
perceive the value of autonomy
10 nor speciﬁc
explanations of how these remarks are supposed
to show that autonomy has value independently of
its value in promoting wellbeing. In fact, only two
arguments for the view that patients’ autonomy
has intrinsic value can be extracted from the
bioethics literature.
11 Below I will consider each
of these two arguments in turn. I will begin with
what would seem to be a somewhat less important
argument and then turn to the main argument for
the view that autonomy has intrinsic value for
patients.
12
The Brave New World
Defenses of the view that autonomy has intrinsic
value sometimes refer to cases where persons are,
in the manner of the people in the society of
Aldous Huxley’s novel The Brave New World,
made completely happy by manipulating their
attitudes so that, contrarily to what really is the
case and what they really would want, they believe
that they are living just the kind of life that they
want to live (see, e.g., Glover, 1977, p. 81).
13 It is
suggested that we would not want to become like
these persons even if we could thereby become
perfectly happy and that this demonstrates that we
put intrinsic value on our autonomy. However, if a
person is to believe that she is living just the kind of
life that she wants to live when in actual fact her
life is quite diﬀerent, all knowledge that her beliefs
concerning her life are artiﬁcially produced must be
erased from her head. In other words, the person’s
self, if it is legitimate to speak of a self in the case of
these kind of persons, must be as artiﬁcial a
product as her belief that she is living the kind of
life that she wants to live is. And it is intuitively
plausible to accept that a person with this kind of
self would not really be a person at all anymore
(cf., e.g., Frankfurt, 1971). So, the comparison here
would not be between being an autonomous
person and being a heteronomous person – a slave,
a prisoner, or a person who is manipulated by
presenting her only one-sided information, for
example –, but between being an autonomous
person and not being a person at all. Consequently,
these kinds of imaginary cases do not demonstrate
that we would rather be less happy autonomous
persons than more happy heteronomous persons.
In other words, they cannot show that we put
intrinsic value on our autonomy.
The value of making our own choices
The main argument for the view that the value of
patients’ autonomy is not exhausted by its instru-
mental value in promoting their wellbeing is of the
following kind. Proponents of this view refer to the
value that making our own choices has for us and
maintain that, at least in the case of signiﬁcant
decisions about our lives, making our own choices
is so valuable for us that we are not willing to let
other people to choose for us even if we are
convinced that they could make better choices than
we can. Some philosophers who accept this view do
not present any reasons to explain this unwilling-
ness. Others maintain that in making our own
choices we are being agents, we are using our
rational capacities, we are controlling our own
lives, we are having a sense of living our own lives,
we are creating and forming ourselves, we are
giving our lives meaning, purpose, and distinctive
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(see Glover, 1977, p. 81; Brock and Buchanan,
1990, pp. 38–39; Harris, 2003, p. 11) Below I will
refer to this argument as the argument for
autonomy.
Our unwillingness to delegate our important choices
to others
Proponents of the argument for autonomy do not
discuss exactly how the cases of our wanting to
make our own choices when we believe that others
could choose better should be deﬁned. Someone
might, for example, argue that, the rare cases of
genuine self-sacriﬁce aside, making one’s own
choices always enhances one’s wellbeing so that
there might not be cases where a person could
decide to make her own choices at the expense of
her wellbeing. I will now put this problem aside
and, for the sake of argument, assume that making
one’s own decisions would not enhance one’s
wellbeing more than letting others choose for one.
Imagine then the case of a patient who is
considering whether or not he should undergo a
complicated medical operation. Let us assume that,
although the patient qualiﬁes as autonomous, he is
not as capable of taking in all the medical
information relevant to assessing the risks and
beneﬁts of the operation as his physician is and
that, as his physician is more mature and experi-
enced in life than he is, the physician is more able
to determine what would best serve the patient’s
good that the patient himself is. The patient is
aware of these differences between him and his
physician, but still wants to make his own decision
about the operation. I assume that this would
qualify as the kind of case that the argument for
autonomy refers to. Someone might however argue
that the patient’s condition has shattered his
existence so that he is not able to make autono-
mous decisions after all. To sidestep the complica-
tions presented by this type of criticism, I will for
now concentrate on the case of healthy persons, in
which this kind of problem does not arise when
other things are assumed to be equal. I however
take it that there can be autonomous patients and
think that the discussion below is relevant to the
questions arising within the medical sphere too.
I assume that the choices of whom to marry and
what line of job to pursue qualify as the kind of
important choices that the argument for autonomy
refers to. Consider then the hypothetical case of
person A who is faced with the option of delegating
her choices of whom to marry and what line of job
to pursue to experts. Let us assume that that
studies show a signiﬁcantly higher level of satis-
faction among marriages and jobs chosen by
experts than among those chosen by the individ-
uals themselves, and that A is aware of this. A has
had many relationships, but to her great regret she
has not been able to ﬁnd a suitable partner for
marriage. Her situation with career is similar to her
predicament with marriage. She has experimented
with many different kinds of jobs, but is quite
frustrated because she has not found anything that
would feel at all right for her.
A is thus in a situation where she has good
reason to believe that others could make better
choices for her than she herself can. Is it plausible
that A, as a reasonable and autonomous person,
would not be willing to delegate her choices of who
to marry and what line of job to pursue to experts?
Because A very much wants to get a satisfying
career and ﬁnd a suitable partner for marriage, it
seems plausible that, rather than not being willing
to delegate her decisions to experts, she would
welcome the possibility to do that. By letting
experts choose for her, A could ﬁnally get her life
to go the way she wants it to go. A could, I think,
be reluctant to renounce these choices to experts
only if she were not really interested in ﬁnding a
suitable partner and a good career.
Would paying attention to the reasons that
proponents of the argument for autonomy present
to explain our alleged unwillingness to let others
choose for us make that argument more plausible?
As was said above, when they explain it, propo-
nents of the argument for autonomy explain this
reluctance by saying that in making our own
choices we are being agents, we are using our
rational capacities, we are controlling our own
lives, we are having a sense of living our own lives,
we are creating and forming ourselves, we are
giving our lives meaning, purpose, and distinctive
uniqueness, and/or we are expressing ourselves.
Referring to these reasons does not seem to be
helpful for the proponents of the argument for
autonomy.Tomentionfewofthemostconspicuous
problems, it seems not at all clear that we (should)
want our lives to be unique – if indeed a coherent
sense can be given to the notion of a person’s life
being unique,
14 – a heteronomous person can have
a sense of living her own life, and exercising one’s
rational capacities does not presuppose autonomy
in the sense relevant here. For exercising one’s
rational capacities is a mental activity that does not
require making real choices among options that are
actually available for one and, thus, persons with
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rational capacities. Furthermore, adopting the
values that the proponents of the argument for
autonomy present to explain our alleged reluctance
towards letting others choose for us does not
commit us to accepting that there is reason to allow
persons to make their own choices when they
consider others more capable of getting good
results for them, since each of these values can be
pursued when persons are better at making choices
than others, or equally good with them. Let us
however now put these problems aside and, with
these alleged reasons for wanting to make our own
choices in mind, consider A’s life after she decided
not to let experts make her choices of whom to
marry and what line of job to pursue.
A continued to seek a partner, but could not
ﬁnd a suitable one. A couple of times she thought
she had found her perfect match, and she even
married twice, but her marriages ended in divorces.
She became even more frustrated with her work,
which currently is nothing but a drag for her. Due
to marital and work problems, she has become
depressive and considers that only alcohol can
console her, etc. However, what has happened to A
follows from her own autonomous choices. She has
been an agent and used her rational capacities to
create herself and to control her life, she has had a
sense of living her own life, and she has deﬁned her
life’s meaning and purpose in her own assumedly
unique way. A then complains to B that she has
ruined her life and that she is miserable. B asks her:
‘‘Can you really ﬁnd nothing of value in your life?’’
After considering B’s question for a while, A
answers: ‘‘It is true that I have completely messed
up my life, but there is one thing that I can be
proud of, one thing that deﬁnitely has value for me:
it is me who has brought about this disaster!’’ If
autonomy would have value for us independently
of its contribution to our wellbeing, A’s answer
could be considered as a serious and reasonable
one. However, rather than as a serious answer to
the question presented to her, A’s reply cannot be
taken as anything else than an ironic self-pitying
remark made in order to ridicule both herself and
the person presenting the question. In other words,
although A is, and has been, autonomous, her
autonomy as such has no value for her.
15
A proponent of the argument for autonomy
might insist that A’s case does not show that we do
not value our autonomy irrespective of its effects
on our wellbeing, but merely that we value other
things in addition to our autonomy. Although A
does value her autonomy, this objection could
proceed, she values the wellbeing that getting a
satisfying job and a good marriage assumedly
could have brought even more. However, the
argument for autonomy claims that we put so
much value on making our own choices in impor-
tant matters of our lives that we are not willing to
give it up even if we were convinced that others
could make better choices for us than we can. If
this were true, A should not be more interested in
her wellbeing than she is in her autonomy.
It might also be suggested that A’s life still went
better than it would have gone without autonomy;
her life would have been even worse if it had been
ruined by someone else than A herself. However, I
would argue that bad choices are the worse for us
the more they are of our own making. If, for
example, a person commits what she considers to
be a terrible crime autonomously, why should she
consider it to be positively valuable for her that it
was she who committed the crime? If committing
the crime requires some special skills that the
person has to a rare degree, she can be proud of
having these skills, but it would be intuitively
implausible to maintain that her using these skills
in a way that she considers to be bad could have
intrinsic positive value for her.
Assuming that experts could have chosen a
good job and a suitable partner for A, those
accepting the argument for autonomy might still
claim that in A’s case the imbalance between
autonomy and wellbeing is too big, and that if the
increase in wellbeing that A could have gained by
renouncing her choices to the experts had been
smaller, A would not have had reason to be willing
to let the experts make her choices for her. But
what would be an acceptable balance between
autonomy and wellbeing for proponents of the
argument for autonomy? Glover (1977, p. 81) says
that if we were hideously tortured or going mad,
we might be willing to sacriﬁce our autonomy to
avoid these disasters. But referring to that kind of
balance between autonomy and wellbeing would
not support the argument for autonomy, since even
A was not, nor is, hideously tortured and there is
no serious threat of her going mad.
To get a case where the imbalance between
autonomy and wellbeing cannot be too big for
proponents of the argument for autonomy, let us
consider the case where renouncing one’s choices
to others could bring one only a small gain in
wellbeing. Let us assume that B has found a
partner that she likes very much and that she is
pursuing a career that brings her great satisfaction.
She is quite happy with both her ﬁance ´ and her job,
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could be even better. B is then offered the
possibility to delegate her decisions of whom to
marry and what line of job to pursue to experts,
and she is aware that studies show a higher level of
satisfaction among marriages and jobs chosen by
experts than among those chosen by the individ-
uals themselves. Should B, as a reasonable
and autonomous person, be reluctant towards
delegating her decisions to experts?
I think that B could be willing to let experts
make her marriage and career choices. And even if
she were not, this could not show that B values her
autonomy irrespective of its effects on her wellbe-
ing. It is plausible that B is emotionally attached to
both her ﬁance ´ and her job and is therefore not
willing to let go of them even though she believes
that the experts could be a little bit better in
choosing a partner and a job for her than she
herself is.
16 And although the studies show a higher
level of satisfaction among marriages and jobs
chosen by experts than among those chosen by
individuals themselves, B may still ﬁnd it doubtful
that in her case experts really could succeed better
than she herself. She is after all a highly competent
person, and probably knows herself better than the
experts. When B considers these things, she may
think that, since she is faring suﬃciently well
already, in her case it does not pay to resort to any
outside help. Her reluctance towards letting others
to make her choices would thus ultimately be based
on her valuing her wellbeing, not on her seeing her
autonomy as valuable irrespective of its role in
promoting her wellbeing.
It could be claimed that although the reason for
our unwillingness to let others make our choices
can sometimes be that we distrust others’ ability to
make better choices than we can, etc., there still are
cases where this reluctance is based on our putting
intrinsic value on our autonomy. But what reason
does one have to accept this? I am unwilling to let
others make my important life choices for me. But
when I consider the possibility of letting others
choose for me and ﬁnd myself being reluctant
towards doing that, I do not think about auton-
omy, agency, self-creation, expressing myself, etc.,
at least not irrespective of their possible role in
promoting my wellbeing. Because I think there is
great variation in what is good and bad for
individual persons and believe that determining
what would promote a person’s wellbeing requires,
among other things, a lot of speciﬁc knowledge
about that person, I simply do not trust that others
really could make choices that would be better for
me than the ones that I can make, and my
reluctance towards letting others choose for me is
based on that. In addition to those discussed
above, the argument for autonomy confronts still
other problems. Below I turn to those difﬁculties.
Delegating our choices to others and autonomy
Proponents of the argument for autonomy thus
aim to demonstrate that autonomy has intrinsic
value for us by drawing attention to the alleged
fact that we are not willing to delegate our
important choices to other people even if we
believe that they can make better choices than we
can. A problem with this line of thinking is that
letting others to make our important choices for us
need not be incompatible with our being autono-
mous. If the person delegating her choices to others
is autonomous to begin with and nobody manip-
ulates or tricks her into renouncing her choices,
coerces her, etc., in the understanding of the nature
of individual autonomy now adopted, she remains
autonomous after letting others make her impor-
tant choices for her. Indeed, if others are more
capable of getting the kind of results that the
person wants, the person who lets others make her
choices for her can thereby become even more
autonomous than she were to begin with. This is
because, as a consequence of letting others make
her important choices for her, her life goes more in
the way that she wants than it would have gone if
she had made her choices by herself. Although the
person resorts to other people’s help, she does this
autonomously and remains as a self-governing
agent. At least for those accepting the procedural
conception of autonomy, letting others make
choices for one can thus be one autonomous
decision among others. But if letting others choose
for one does not compromise one’s autonomy,
arguing that we would not be willing to let others
make our choices for us even if we believed them to
be able to make better choices than we cannot
demonstrate that we put intrinsic value on our
autonomy.
A proponent of the argument for autonomy
might object that we should see autonomy as a
property of decisions and choices and that if a
person lets others make her choices for her, she
cannot be autonomous anymore. Let us, for the
sake of argument, assume that autonomy is not
primarily a property of persons, but a character-
istic of the decisions and choices that persons
make. However, when, for example, a patient
autonomously decides to undergo a complicated
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omous with respect to that surgery even though she
does not autonomously choose each action per-
formed during the operation. Similarly, an auton-
omous person remains autonomous after letting
others choose a job and a partner for her. If it is
objected that the patient who gives her autono-
mous consent to undergo the surgery assesses each
of the actions that will be performed during the
operation beforehand and gives her advanced
consent to them, it can be responded that this is
possible in the case of the person who delegates her
career and marriage choices to others too.
A critic might still insist that, even if her life
would go more in the way that she wants it to go
after she renounces her choices to others, the
person who lets others choose for her is heteron-
omous with respect to making the particular
choices that others then make on her behalf. As
the person does not make these choices herself, this
possible objection could proceed, she is not in
control of them anymore. There are two points I
would like to make concerning this possible crit-
icism. First, the notion of control’ can be under-
stood in different ways. But at least when the
person is able to withdraw her consent to letting
others choose for her, it is intuitively plausible to
accept that, in the sense relevant here, she has
control over the choices that others make on her
behalf. And in medicine, with the exception of
patients like those who are under the inﬂuence of
heavy anaesthetic, a patient who has given her
informed consent to undergo a treatment is usually
able to withdraw this consent if that is what she
wants to do. Second, contrary to what this
criticism presupposes, we should not accept that
a person can be in the relevant sense in control of
choices, decisions, and actions only if she performs
them by herself. Accepting that a person can be
autonomous with respect to choices, decisions, and
actions only if she controls them in the sense that
she performs them by herself has the counter-
intuitive implication that patients can remain
autonomous only if they treat themselves without
any resort to outside help.
17 Consequently, I take it
that this criticism should not be accepted.
Its explanation of our alleged unwillingness to
let others make our choices for us results in a still
further problem for the argument for autonomy.
On the basis of my own case, I would argue that a
person who considers the possibility of letting
others choose for him and ﬁnds himself being
reluctant towards doing that need not think about
autonomy, self-creation, expressing herself, giving
his life unique meaning, etc., at least not indepen-
dently of their possible role in enhancing the
person’s wellbeing. If it is required that these
things are an autonomous person’s reasons for not
letting others choose for her, it seems that the
procedural conception of autonomy is being left
behind. Although making such a requirement
would not result in presenting substantive ends
for autonomous persons so that one would then
maintain, for example, that wanting to be a
subservient housewife or requesting for euthanasia
can never be autonomous, it would however rule
out some substantive views on other than purely
procedural grounds. To maintain that an autono-
mous person wants to express herself, that an
autonomous person wants to have a distinctive and
unique life, etc. is to say, for example, that a person
who does not want to stand out from others and
prefers to live a quiet and ordinary life that is not
expressive of an unique self, etc. is heteronomous.
And, for obvious reasons, saying that this kind of
person is heteronomous cannot be based on purely
procedural points of departure. Thus, the view
maintaining that an autonomous person does not
want to let others choose for her because she wants
to express herself, because she wants to have an
unique life, etc. is incompatible with the procedural
conception of autonomy that the proponents of the
argument for autonomy accept.
It might be objected that at least agency and
having control over one’s life are the kind of
reasons that are compatible with accepting a
procedural conception of autonomy. However, in
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted sui-
cide, for example, one ceases to be an agent and
loses control over one’s life. If a conception of
autonomy rules out these procedures to begin with,
it cannot be a purely procedural conception of
autonomy. In other words, if the argument for
autonomy presupposes that one must want to be
an agent and to have control over one’s life so that
one cannot want to request for euthanasia or to
desire to make a suicide, then its conception of
autonomy is not procedural.
To recapitulate, the argument for autonomy
consists of maintaining that we would not be
willing to let others make our important choices
for us even if we believed that they could make
better choices than we can. This is taken to
demonstrate that we put intrinsic value on our
autonomy. And some of the proponents of the
argument for autonomy maintain that our alleged
unwillingness to let others choose for us can be
explained by referring to the fact that in making
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our rational capacities, we are controlling our own
lives, we are having a sense of living our own lives,
we are creating and forming ourselves, we are
giving our lives meaning, purpose, and distinctive
uniqueness, and/or we are expressing ourselves.
Above I argued for several points against the
argument for autonomy. First, contrary to what
the argument for autonomy presupposes, it plau-
sible that autonomous and reasonable persons are
willing to let others choose for them if they believe
that others can make better choices than they
themselves can. Second, many of the reasons that
proponents of the argument for autonomy present
for our alleged reluctance towards letting others
choose for us do not presuppose autonomy. Third,
accepting the reasons for our alleged unwillingness
to let others choose for us that the proponents of
the argument for us that the proponents of the
argument for autonomy refer to does not commit
one to accepting that persons should be allowed to
make their own choices when other could choose
better than them, because these reasons can be
pursued when others are equally good, or worse, at
making choices. Fourth, even if a person would not
be willing to let others choose for her, this would
not demonstrate that she puts intrinsic value on her
autonomy, as this unwillingness has other, and
more plausible, explanations. Fifth, contrary to
what the argument for autonomy presupposes, if
one’s decision to let others choose for one is
autonomous, it does not compromise one’s auton-
omy. Sixth, the reasons that proponents of the
argument for autonomy present for our alleged
reluctance towards letting others choose for us are
incompatible with the procedural conception of
autonomy that they accept.
18 I conclude that the
argument for autonomy is not able to show that
autonomy has intrinsic value for us.
Possible objections considered
Above I have already addressed some minor
objections, but in this section will concentrate on
more fundamental criticisms of the main argument
of this paper.
Ultimate values cannot be justiﬁed?
It might be objected that it is not reasonable to
insist that proponents of autonomy should be able
to justify the view that patients’ autonomy has
intrinsic value, since autonomy is a fundamental
value and fundamental values cannot be justiﬁed.
There are two points I would like to make
regarding this possible criticism. First, although
disagreements about fundamental values have
most probably existed trough human history, and
many of them have survived two millennia of
philosophical analysis, the question of whether or
not fundamental values can be justiﬁed would seem
to be an open one. At least, metaethical discussion
concerning questions about the ontological status
of values and our ability to have knowledge about
what is valuable and what is not is still going on,
and many philosophers are optimistic about the
possibility of justifying even fundamental values
(see, e.g., Smith, 2002; Watkins and Jolley, 2002;
Rachels, 2003).
Second, even if it were the case that fundamen-
tal values cannot be given any strong justiﬁcation,
requiring at least some plausible reasons for
considering autonomy to have intrinsic value
would seem to be reasonable. For even if we
accepted that fundamental values cannot be justi-
ﬁed in any strong sense, we have some criteria for
what we allow as fundamental values, and it can be
asked whether or not autonomy fulﬁls that criteria.
Even if a person sincerely declares that her ultimate
end in life is to, say, eat pebbles, most of us would,
I think, be hesitant towards accepting eating
pebbles as a fundamental value. Instead of imme-
diately taking it that eating pebbles can be a
fundamental value for an autonomous person, we
would at least want to be assured that the person
accepting it as a fundamental value really is
autonomous. We thus have some criteria of what
qualiﬁes as a fundamental value, and of all
candidates for such a value it can be asked whether
or not they fulﬁl that criteria and why.
Who has the burden of proof?
It might be objected that even though we have
some criteria for what can and what cannot be a
fundamental value for autonomous persons, it is
quite clear that autonomy satisﬁes that criteria.
Instead of requiring that autonomy’s value should
be justiﬁed, this possible criticism could proceed, it
is the view that rejects autonomy’s having intrinsic
value for us that is in need of justiﬁcation. Since
autonomy is so widely valued, it is clear that the
burden of proof here is on the side that wants to
reject the view that autonomy has intrinsic value.
However, although autonomy is a central value
in Western medicine and medical ethics, as I said
above, exactly what role it should have in medicine
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should be valued irrespective of its role in promot-
ing patients’ wellbeing, and even those bioethicists
who consider there to be cases where autonomy
should override wellbeing disagree on what these
cases are. Consequently, it is plausible to take it
that the burden of proof here is on the proponents
of the view that patients’ autonomy should be
valued even if it were not conducive to patients’
wellbeing.
Are justiﬁcations unnecessary in self-regarding
matters?
It could also be objected that even though the view
that patients’ autonomy has intrinsic value is
controversial, we are now discussing patients’
self-regarding matters. And, this possible objection
could proceed, respecting persons as persons
requires that in their self-regarding matters auton-
omous persons are allowed to do whatever they
want, irrespective of whether or not their actions
can be given any justiﬁcation.
For the sake of argument, I will now assume that
a plausible distinction between self-regarding and
other-regarding matters can be made, and that the
patients’ actions now in question fall into the self-
regarding category. As I have explained above,
proponents of autonomy maintain that we value
autonomy so much that we want to make our own
decisions even if we know them to be bad ones, or at
least not as good as they could be.
19 Thus the
questionhereisaboutacasewherethepatientwhois
not willing to let others choose for her even though
she believes others to be able to make better choices
wants something that has value for her. Then, even
though there were no need for the patient to justify
her choices to others, it can be asked whether or not
she is able to justify them to herself.
If a person who wants something that has value
for her cannot explain to herself how what she is
contemplating of doing could bring her something
of value, she is being irrational. Although the
procedural conception of autonomy allows persons
to completely disregard themselves if that is what
they autonomously want, it excludes this kind of
irrationality. The kind of minimal instrumental
rationality now at issue is arguably required by any
plausible conception of individual autonomy. So,
either the person who is not willing to let others
make choices for her when she is convinced that
others could make better choices than she herself
can is heteronomous or she sees something in
making her own choices that overrides the loss of
wellbeing she is willing to undergo by not letting
others make her choices for her. But what could
this something be?
Above I argued that the arguments bioethicists
have presented for the view that patients’ auton-
omy has value over and beyond its value in
promoting the patients’ wellbeing are not plausible.
If these arguments are not able to show that
procedural autonomy has intrinsic value for us,
nor to demonstrate that we can hold autonomy as
a fundamental intrinsic value, how can the patient
now in question justify to herself that making her
own choices would be valuable for her irrespective
of their consequences to her wellbeing? If she is
unable to explain that, she does not qualify as an
autonomous agent and, consequently, her case is
irrelevant to the present discussion as this debate
concerns the case of autonomous persons. Thus,
even if we allowed autonomous patients to do what
they want in their self-regarding matters, and the
kind of medical matters now at issue were purely
self-regarding, it seems that autonomous patients
could not be willing to make their own choices
when they are convinced that others could make
better choices for them.
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Conclusion
In this article I have examined the arguments that
bioethicists have presented for the view that
patients’ autonomy has value over and beyond its
value in promoting the patients’ wellbeing. I
concentrated on the procedural conception of
autonomy commonly accepted in medical ethics,
and maintained that the arguments to the effect
that patients’ autonomy has intrinsic value are not
plausible. To the extent that this is acceptable, in
cases where autonomous patients want to make
choices that they admit to be bad for them, it is
more plausible to take them to be speaking about
badness in inverted commas than to accept that
there is intrinsic value in autonomy that could
overweigh the harm or loss of wellbeing that they
would suffer as a result of their making bad
choices. In other words, in the light of the main
argument of this article, it is plausible that ulti-
mately the question with these kind of cases is
about competing conceptions about what is good
and bad for patients, not about the value of
autonomy. As long as medical ethics refers to the
procedural conception of autonomy and more
plausible arguments for the view that patients’
autonomy has intrinsic value are not presented,
THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY IN MEDICAL ETHICS 385patients’ autonomy should be taken to have only
instrumental value in medicine.
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Notes
1. Beauchamp and Childress (2001, pp. 185–187) also
maintain that ‘‘under some conditions a narrow range
of strongly paternalistic acts is justiﬁed.’’ This means
that in the majority of cases autonomy can override
wellbeing. And Beauchamp and Childress (2001, p.
186) are inclined to accept that even when paternal-
ism is justiﬁed, the paternalistic action should not
‘‘substantially restrict autonomy.’’
2. See, e.g., Beauchamp and Childress (2001, pp. 185–
187) and Glover (1977, p. 75 cf. p. 81). All philoso-
phers accepting the view that patients should be al-
lowed to make choices that these patients admit to be
bad, or at least not as good as they could be, do not
specify whether they think there to be some cases
where autonomous patients’ self-regarding actions
can be restricted.
3. Harris would seem to hold this kind of view. Harris
(2003, p. 11) writes as follows: ‘‘Concern for welfare
ceases to be legitimate at the point at which, so far
from being productive of autonomy, so far from en-
abling the individual to create her own life, it oper-
ates to frustrate the individual’s own attempts to
create her own life herself.’’
4. Alternatively, it can be taken that autonomy is a
property of decisions and choices (see, e.g., Beau-
champ and Childress (2001, p. 58)). To the extent
that it is necessary from the point of view of the
main argument of this paper, I will return to this dis-
tinction between autonomy as a property of decisions
and choices and autonomy as a property of persons
below.
5. For a defense of a partly substantive conception of
autonomy see Oshana (1998).
6. The views that are referred to as Kantian can be even
radically dissimilar to each other, see, e.g., Secker
(1999) for discussion.
7. The most common criticism of the procedural theories
of individual autonomy is that in stressing the value
of a person’s own independent decisions, they are
incompatible with such communitarian virtues as
empathy, loyalty, and care and respect for tradition,
ritual, and the counsel of others. For a plausible reply
to this criticism see Oshana (2001) (whose own theory
of autonomy contains substantive elements) and also,
e.g., Gylling (2004). Oshana argues that this commu-
nitarian criticism of individual autonomy is an objec-
tion to a straw man, while Gylling warns us about
uncritical acceptance of traditional values. Gylling
writes, ‘‘If moral integrity is to have any meaning,
ethically attentive individuals should critically assess
the merits and dismerits of predominant credos. Con-
servative and unquestioning acceptance of traditional
values may turn moral life into a mechanical – even if
bona ﬁde – acceptance of either ruthless and inhuman
morals or a hollow etiquette, a code of honor.’’ Gyl-
ling (2004, p. 46).
8. In addition to the philosophers who maintain that
patients’ autonomy has value beyond its instrumental
value in promoting the patients’ wellbeing mentioned
above see, e.g., Mappes and Zembaty (1991), Mat-
thews (2000), Secker (1999), and Young (1998). For
discussion of Kant’s and Kantian concepts of auton-
omy in medicine and some persuasive arguments
against the view that medical ethics should refer to
these kinds of conceptions to autonomy, see, e.g.,
Matthews (2000), Secker (1999), and Takala and
Ha ¨ yry (2000).
9. That I will not argue for the possibility of intrinsic
value in general should not beg the question here,
since I will be arguing against the view that patients’
autonomy has intrinsic value.
10. It could be objected that if the proponents of the
view that patients’ autonomy has value for the pa-
tients over and beyond its value in promoting their
wellbeing do not specify how they perceive the value
of autonomy, it is implausible to maintain that they
consider autonomy to have intrinsic value for the pa-
tients. However, at least when other things are being
equal, the most plausible interpretation of the view
that patients’ autonomy has value for them over and
beyond its instrumental value in enhancing their well-
being is that autonomy has intrinsic, and not eco-
nomic, aesthetic, etc., value for them.
11. Sometimes defenses of personal autonomy refer to
Kant and Mill (see, e.g., Beauchamp and Childress
(2001; pp. 63–64, cf. p. 351)). But since Kant deems
the choices a person makes on the basis of her own
desires, inclinations, and wishes as heteronomous,
Kant is not directly relevant to arguing for the kind
of autonomy that has a prominent role in contempo-
rary medicine. For detailed arguments to this eﬀect
see, e.g., Matthews (2000) and Secker (1999). And it
is unclear to what extent Mill considered autonomy
to have intrinsic value, and whether or not putting
intrinsic value on autonomy is consistent with his
utilitarianism. Be that as it may, Mill did maintain
that making our own choices exercises our rational
capacities and helps us to build a character (Mill,
1985, pp. 122–124), and these reasons for putting
intrinsic value on autonomy are discussed below.
12. Gillon (2003, p. 310) says that autonomy is morally
precious because it makes morality possible. It is not
altogether clear how this should be taken. If it means
that autonomy should be valued because it gives per-
sons the possibility to perform morally good actions,
it can be responded that these goods are overweighed
by the grave moral wrongs that autonomy makes
possible to commit. Procedural autonomy in itself is
neutral between morally good and bad actions and
can be used in good and bad ways (see, e.g., Dworkin
(1988)). And even if we concentrated on the morally
good things that autonomy makes possible, it can be
asked are these things better than the kinds of goods
JUKKA VARELIUS 386that do not involve autonomy? In other words, this
line of thinking would just take us back to the ques-
tion of does autonomy have intrinsic value. Further-
more, we can reasonably consider persons as morally
culpable for actions that they did not perform auton-
omously (see, e.g., Oshana (2002)). For example, con-
sider the case in which a heavily drunk person hits
another person with her car with the consequence
that the latter person dies. It is intuitively plausible to
consider the drunk as morally culpable for the other
person’s death even if she did not autonomously
choose to kill him. And ﬁnally, the view that auton-
omy is morally precious because it makes morality
possible would seem to make the value of autonomy
derivative from the value of morality.
13. Glover (1977, p. 75) also says that if someone wants
to start taking heroin, he thinks it right to stop the
person, because he gives less weight to autonomy in
this matter than to sparing the person ‘‘the appalling
suﬀering involved in the slow death of a heroin
addict.’’ Glover thus accepts that autonomy can be
restricted only if there is threat of extremely severe
harm to wellbeing.
14. Our lives can of course be unique in the trivial sense
that no one else was born from the same parents at
exactly the same time, but this would not seem to
support the argument for autonomy.
15. There admittedly are persons who declare that even
though the choices they have made were bad, were
they given the possibility to go back in time and
start all over again, they would make exactly the
same choices as they did the ﬁrst time around. But,
as such, their cases do not imply that autonomous
persons would really want to repeat choices that
they consider to be altogether bad. There are advan-
tages in being able to retain a positive image of one-
self in the eyes of oneself and others, and to the
extent that these declarations are not these persons’
attempts to present themselves as more competent
agents than they have been, it is plausible, I think,
that they consider that nobody could have been able
to help them and that as a result of making their
mistakes they have learnt valuable lessons and con-
sequently know how to avoid similar mistakes in the
future.
16. I do not mean to confuse considering the thought-
experiment with actually choosing whether or not let
others choose for one. However, if the former is to be
plausible and eﬀective, it must be quite reminiscent of
the latter, and hence follows this problem.
17. Relevant to this point is, e.g., May’s (2005) response
to the criticisms of autonomy maintaining that the
conception of self that autonomy usually presupposes
cuts the self oﬀ from others and therefore cannot ac-
count for the signiﬁcance of the social dimensions of
identity, relationships, etc. Instead of considering an
autonomous agent to be an island, May maintains
that an autonomous person should be seen as a
helmsman who steers her own life and may resort to
others’ assistance in doing so.
18. It could be maintained that the problems pertaining
to the reasons that allegedly make us reluctant to-
wards letting others choose for us are problems only
to those proponents of the argument for autonomy
who refer to them and that therefore those philoso-
phers accepting the argument for autonomy who do
not speak about these reasons can still be considered
to have a plausible view about the value of auton-
omy. However, of the objections listed above, one,
four, and ﬁve do apply to these philosophers’ view
and these criticisms are suﬃcient to show that the
argument for autonomy that does not refer to the
problematic reasons referred to above is not able to
establish the view that autonomy has intrinsic value
for us.
19. I now refer to making one’s own choices only, but
what I will say below applies, mutatis mutandis, to the
case of the Brave New World argument as well.
20. It could be maintained that although autonomy does
not have intrinsic value, it still is a necessary condi-
tion of everything that has value for us (see, e.g.,
Rachels and Ruddick (1989)) and, consequently, it
should always be taken into account even if this were
not the instrumentally best way to promote a pa-
tient’s wellbeing. However, even if we accepted that
autonomy conditions the value that things have for
us, it seems that then bad choices would be the worse
for us the more they were of our own making. In
other words, even if we accepted that autonomy has
this kind of conditional value, that a bad choice is
made autonomously would not make that choice
good for one.
21. I thank Juha Ra ¨ ikka ¨ and two anonymous reviewers for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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